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I. Introduction
The cross-pollination of technology and advertising has 
blossomed over the last several decades.1  Armed with technology, 
advertisers can entice consumer audiences with personal, targeted 
messages about their products.2  Software programs target code words 
in e-mails and social networking sites to tailor advertisements to a 
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate, 2011.
University of California, San Diego, B.A. Political Science with American Politics 
concentration, minor in Literature & Writing.  I would like to thank my faculty adviser, 
Professor Jo Carrillo, for her thoughtful guidance and my family and friends for their 
support in drafting this Note.  I would also like to thank the Comm/Ent staff, Professor 
Lothar Determann, Matthew Avery, Madhusudan Raman, and Raquel Friedman for their 
contributions to the inception and development of this Note. 
1. See, e.g., Don Corbett, Virtual Espionage: Spyware and the Common Law Privacy
Torts, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) for an example of advertising and technology 
synthesis, discussing a marketing evolution via the Internet. 
2.  See Targeted Ads in Gmail, GMAIL, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/
about_privacy.html#targeted_ads (last visited Apr. 2, 2011); Scanning Email Content, 
GMAIL, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about_privacy.html#scanning_email (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2011); Facebook Adverts, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/advertising/ 
?campaign_id=402047449186&placement=pflo&extra_1=0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
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person’s presumed interests.3  Social networking and online shopping 
sites can learn or remember birthdays of loved ones to timely present 
consumers with gift ideas via e-mails or messages on social 
networking sites.  The more advertising flourishes, the more invasive 
technology becomes.  While this hybrid species benefits most business 
models, it might also be toxic to consumer privacy and property 
rights. 
This Note focuses on a recent advertising campaign that covertly 
incorporated global positioning system (“GPS”) technology into 
furniture that was essentially given away for advertising purposes. 
Superficially, tracking the location of furniture may appear 
unobtrusive.  However, this Note is concerned with the intermingling 
of advertising with technology that does more than sit passively in a 
consumer’s home, but actually communicates information about the 
consumer to the advertiser.  Part II of this Note provides background 
on the advertising campaign for Blu Dot.  Part III discusses potential 
legal causes of action Blu Dot’s advertising agency could face, such as 
trespass and invasion of privacy.  Finally, Part IV analyzes current 
legislation protecting consumer privacy and proposes creating new 
laws that will better protect consumers from these invasive 
advertising tactics. 
II. Background on the “Real Good Experiment”
Blu Dot is a Minnesota-based company that designs and 
manufactures furniture with a modern flair.4  In the fall of 2009, Blu 
Dot hired Mono, an advertising agency, to run an innovative new 
advertising campaign.5  The campaign, entitled the “Real Good 
Experiment” (“Experiment”) was described as “a study in human 
behavior, new forms of viral marketing and the recession friendly 
urban phenomenon of ‘curb mining.’”6  According to Mono, the 
purpose of the Experiment was to discover what would happen to 
3.  See Harry Huai Wang, Never Forget a Birthday, FACEBOOK (Nov. 14, 2008, 5:01
PM), http://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=38780477130; Sara Schonfeld, Merge 
Between Online Shopping, Social Networking Yields Privacy Concerns, THE DAILY 
PENNSYLVANIAN (Jan. 27, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com/ 
article/merge-between-online-shopping-social-networking-yields-privacy-concerns. 
4. Our Story, BLU DOT, http://www.bludot.com/about-bludot-dir/our-story (last
visited Jan. 28, 2010). 
5. Rob Walker, A Real Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at MM26.
6. Andy Jordan, Busted! New Yorkers Caught Nabbing Street Chairs, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/video/busted-new-yorkers-caught-nabbing-street-
chairs/04BEC9BF-E56F-43CE-8293-6A9B2CC8A70E.html. 
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designer chairs left on the street: “Where would they go?  Who would 
pick them up?  Where would they find their new homes.”7 
Mono produced a short film based on the advertising campaign 
that promised to show “intrigue,” “love,” and “drama.”8  However, 
the film more accurately depicted Mono spying on the lives and 
property of twenty-five largely unsuspecting persons.9 
Mono initiated the Experiment by scattering twenty-five stylish 
Blu Dot chairs throughout the streets of New York City.10  Mono 
created a surveillance perimeter around the chairs to watch what 
happened to them.11  Mono employees were positioned with cameras 
on nearby rooftops and street corners.12  They communicated through 
walkie talkies and used code names, working as a unit to monitor the 
furniture.13   
Arbitrary persons then took the seemingly abandoned chairs into 
their homes under the watchful eyes (and cameras) of Mono’s 
agents.14  Mono filmed the chairs from the time they were dropped on 
the street, while they were inspected by potential unidentified new 
chair owners (code named “PUNCOs”), and until they had been 
whisked away by identified new chair owners (“INCOs”).15  Mono’s 
agents would follow the INCOs until losing visual contact.16 
Unbeknownst to most of the INCOs, Mono had hidden GPS 
tracking devices inside several of these chairs.17  Mono posted a map 
of the city on Blu Dot’s website with markers indicating the locations 
of the furniture according to these GPS devices.18  The website 
encouraged viewers to watch the “journey” of the chairs until Mono 
7. Id.
8. Realgoodchair, The Blu Dot Real Good Experiment: Trailer, YOUTUBE (Dec. 11,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0JHqGiHPo4. 
9. See Walker, supra note 5 (Walker classifies these persons as “largely”
unsuspecting because Mono had advertised the experiment on various social networking 
sites such as Twitter.  As such, some of the “curb miners” may have been aware of the 
experiment.  At least one individual who found a chair located and removed the GPS 
device.). 
10. Id.
11. The Real Good Experiment Film, BLU DOT, http://www.bludot.com/bonus-tracks-
dir/rge (last visited March 5, 2010). 
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Walker, supra note 5.
15. Real Good Experiment Film, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Walker, supra note 5.
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replaced the map with a short film based on the Experiment.19  The 
film also reveals that Mono used the GPS trackers to locate the chairs 
at the homes of the INCOs.20  Mono agents knocked on the INCOs’ 
doors and asked to speak to them about their decision to take the 
chairs in filmed interviews.21  In these interviews, the INCOs 
expressed surprise that Mono had been tracking the chairs.22 
III. Analysis of Potential Legal Causes of Action against
Mono for the Covert Use of GPS in the Advertising
Campaign 
The integration of GPS technology in advertising is certainly 
innovative.  The Experiment drew so much attention that details of 
the campaign made its way into premier publications such as the Wall 
Street Journal and the New York Times.23  However, this innovative 
advertising may reach beyond the limits of the law by infringing 
consumer property rights and invading consumer privacy.   
A. Infringement of Property Rights
Property rights are often analogized as a “bundle of rights.”24
This bundle includes the rights to exclude, transfer, possess, and use 
property.25  When the right to exclude is infringed upon, it typically 
takes the form of a trespass either to chattels or real property.26  Thus, 
Mono may have trespassed when it knowingly maintained a GPS 
signal on its products after the INCOs had taken them. 
1. Trespass to Chattels
Technology has resurrected the doctrine of trespass to chattels,
“which had been largely relegated to a historical note in legal 
textbooks.”27  Chattels are generally understood to be personal 




23. Walker, supra note 5; Jordan, supra note 6.
24. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (2000).  For
discussion on the right to exclude, see Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 209 Wis. 2d 605, 617–18 
(Wis. 1997).  Accord Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (quoting 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)). 
25. See SPRANKLING, supra note 24, at 4–5.
26. Id.
27. Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  See
also Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 27–28 
(2000), stating: 
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property that is moveable and transferable, unlike the immovable 
land-based category of property known as real property.28  The 
chattels at hand are the Blu Dot chairs equipped with GPS devices. 
Trespass to chattels may be committed when a person either: (1) 
intentionally dispossesses another of their property, or (2) uses or 
intermeddles with another’s property.29  This Part will determine if 
the actions taken by Blu Dot meet the requirements for trespass to 
chattels. 
The comments provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(“Restatement”) explain that a dispossession occurs when one takes 
or destroys another’s property.30  The film based on the Experiment 
shows the only physical contact with the chairs after being taken by 
the INCOs occurs through an electronic signal sent to the GPS 
device.31  There is no indication that Mono repossessed, destroyed, or 
even laid hand on the chairs.32  In the filmed interviews, the INCOs 
were seen using the chairs and expressing satisfaction with the 
chairs.33  Without further evidence suggesting Mono committed such 
acts, this provision is not likely applicable. 
However, although Mono did not physically dispossess property, 
they may have intermeddled with the INCOs’ property.  The 
Restatement defines intermeddling as “intentionally bringing about a 
physical contact with the chattel.”34   
[T]respass to chattels, which seems to have become the darling of
cyberspace lawyers. In a series of recent decisions, led by the opinion in
CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, courts have used this obscure
nineteenth century claim to exclude unsolicited bulk e-mail or “spam”
first from the computer systems of Internet subscription services, and
more recently from corporate computer systems.
Burk also describes the reasoning courts have chosen to evaluate technological invasions 
as a trespass to chattels rather than conversion because it is unclear that intangible 
influences and properties can be converted.  Further, conversion is a total dispossession 
while trespass to chattels may be a partial interference.  Id. at 29–30 (citing Thrifty-Tel, 
Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). 
28. State v. Donahue, 144 P. 755, 758 (Or. 1914)
29. Sotelo, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217
(1965)). 
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217, cmt. & illus. (1965).
31. The Real Good Experiment Film, supra note 11.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217, Comments and Illustrations, cmt. (e)
(1965). 
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The Restatement illustrates three ways in which a person might 
intermeddle with one’s chattel.  First, an actor may commit a trespass 
by intentionally touching another’s chattel.35  For example, “beat[ing] 
another’s horse or dog, or by intentionally directing an object or 
missile against it, as when the actor throws a stone at another’s 
automobile or intentionally drives his own car against it.”36  Second, 
an actor may also commit a trespass by inducing a third party to 
intermeddle with another’s chattel through duress or fraud.37  Finally, 
“[a]n actor may commit a trespass by so acting upon a chattel as 
intentionally to cause it to come in contact with some other object, as 
when a herd of sheep is deliberately driven or frightened down a 
declivity.”38 
The Restatement further warns that “[i]f such intermeddling with 
another’s chattel is done without his consent and without any other 
privilege, the actor is subject to liability for harm thus caused to the 
chattel.”39  Courts have interpreted this to mean that while 
“intermeddling” creates liability, there must also have been a harm in 
order to award damages.40  However, the harm need not be a physical 
harm suffered by chattel so long as there is a proximate relationship 
between the trespass and the harm.41   
A strong analogy to the potential trespass caused by the 
Experiment is electronic spam (“spam”).  Spam is an “unsolicited 
commercial message often sent to “hundreds of thousands of Internet 
users at once.”42  In Compuserve Incorporated v. Cyber Promotions, 
Cyber Promotions used Compuserve’s e-mail networks to send 





39. Id.  See also Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (citing Zaslow v. Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 18 (Cal. 1946)) (stating: 
Where the conduct complained of does not amount to a substantial 
interference with possession or the right thereto, but consists of 
intermeddling with or use of or damages to the personal property, the 
owner has a cause of action for trespass or case, and may recover only 
the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property 
or the loss of its use.) 
40. Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005);
Glidden v. Szybiak, 63 A.2d 233 (N.H. 1949). 
41. Burk, supra note 27, at 28.
42. Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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clients to hundreds of thousands of Internet users.”43  The Ohio 
district court found “[e]lectronic signals generated and sent by 
computer. . . . sufficiently physically tangible to support a trespass 
cause of action.”44  Furthermore, the court found that the spam e-
mails harmed Compuserve’s property.45  Though the spam did not 
cause direct physical harm to Compuserve’s hardware, the court 
found spam could diminish the value of equipment by draining 
computer processing power and taking up disk space.46 
One court has also held that unfavorable emotions caused by 
spyware can qualify as an actionable harm under trespass law.47  
Spyware is a “variety of software that operates covertly on personal 
computers to track user behavior and display advertising.”48  In Sotelo 
v. DirectRevenue, the court applied trespass to chattels in the context
of spyware.49  The court recognized that spyware can create technical
problems, such as causing:
[C]omputers to slow down, take up the bandwidth of the
user’s Internet connection, incur increased Internet-use
charges, deplete a computer’s memory, utilize pixels and
screen-space on monitors, require more energy because
slowed computers must be kept on for longer, and reduce a
user’s productivity.50
In addition to physical harms to the computers, the court also 
cited user frustration as a damage caused by spyware.51 
The Experiment did make use of the chairs taken by the INCOs. 
Mono tracked the INCOs and advertised their locations online using 
the device installed into the chair.52  It is not clear whether a court 
would find that the INCOs incurred a tangible harm.53  There is no 
43. Id. at 1017.
44. Id. at 1021.
45. Id. at 1022.
46. Id.
47. Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
48. Jacob Kreutzer, Somebody Has to Pay: Products Liability for Spyware, 45 AM.
BUS. L.J. 61, 105 n.1 (2008). 
49. Sotelo, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Walker, supra note 5.
53. See Susan M. Ballantine, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving New Problems
with Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209, 212 (2000) (discussing the difficulty 
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indication that the operation of the GPS device had in any way 
diminished the ability to use the chair.54  The film based on the 
advertising campaign shows that the GPS devices were merely 
attached to the bottom of the chairs and does not suggest Mono 
compromised the structural integrity of the chairs.55  Even if the 
installation had caused any harm, it seems that those alterations 
would have occurred before the INCOs had come into possession of 
the chair and, as such, would not be a viable claim for the INCO. 
However, the logic from the court in Sotelo indicates that negative 
emotions caused by trespass can be considered in an action for 
damages.56  This rationale opens the door to possible claims for the 
INCOs against Blu Dot.  For example, an INCO may have suffered 
emotional distress after finding out that a GPS tracker hidden in his 
or her chair had been publicly broadcasting its location to the world, 
raising a variety of privacy and security concerns.  Indeed, these 
designer chairs had been widely publicized across the entire gamut of 
social media and had sent some fans wildly chasing after these 
chairs.57  Or perhaps shame derived by having one’s “curb-mining” 
propensities broadcasted in various forms of media could suffice as a 
harm proximately caused by the trespass. 
Additionally, for policy reasons, a court could broadly consider 
the impact of GPS devices being used covertly under any 
circumstances in order to conjure scenarios with greater damages and 
avoid setting bad precedent.  Imagine virtual databases that criminals 
might build or peruse, detailing exactly where they can find what they 
want and who to target.  Placing GPS devices in a watch or a car 
could inform theft operations of when targets will be away from their 
homes.  This could lead to a loss of privacy and a corresponding 
concern for security. 
Even if a judge determines that the GPS devices caused an actual 
harm, the INCO must be able to prove that the chair was in fact its 
chattel.  To determine the property rights of the INCOs over the 
chair, the ownership status of both the original (Mono) and new 
suing under the trespass to chattels theory and identifying harm where an intruder 
accessed computer networks). 
54. The Real Good Experiment Film, supra note 11.
55. Id.
56. In Sotelo, the court considered the emotional frustration involved in using a
machine infected with Spyware in the discussion of harm.  384 F. Supp 2d at 1230. 
57. Don Crossland, Blu Dot’s Real Good Experiment, KONTAKTMAG (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.kontaktmag.com/blog/blu-dots-real-good-experiment/. 
57. Walker, supra note 5.
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property holders (INCOs) must be evaluated.  When property has 
been separated from its original owner it generally falls within three 
property categories: abandoned, lost, or mislaid.58 
Property is “abandoned” when the original property owner 
intends to relinquish all right, title, and interest in the property.59  This 
triggers the aforementioned bundle of rights.60  Where the owner 
intends to give up his right to exclude, transfer, or possess and use the 
property, abandonment has occurred.  Consider this example: 
[I]f O deposits a broken toy on the sidewalk so that it can be
removed by garbage collectors, he has abandoned it.  On the
other hand, if O merely leaves the toy on the sidewalk
overnight, intending to reclaim it in the morning, no
abandonment has occurred.61
The act of abandoning the property means that the property 
becomes unowned.62  The first person to take possession of 
abandoned property thus gains exclusive rights to the property.63  This 
means that neither the original owner nor other prospective property 
owners may exercise control over the property without the finder 
granting such rights.64 
Property will be categorized as lost where “the owner 
unintentionally and involuntarily parts with it through neglect or 
inadvertence and does not know where it is.”65  To illustrate, lost 
property would include money that unintentionally falls out of one’s 
pocket.66 
Unlike abandoned property, when property is lost, the finder does 
not inherit original owner’s property rights with the finding.67  
Interestingly enough, this also does not mean that the possessor 
necessarily has no rights over the property.68  Rather, the finder is 




62. Id. at 38.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 36 (citing Benjamin v. Lindner Aviation, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1995)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 37–38 (“finder’s agent who mistakenly delivered found tools to third party
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frequently given constructive possession over the item that can be 
superseded only if the original owner claims the property.69 
Property is mislaid when the owner “voluntarily puts it in a 
particular place, intending to retain ownership, but then fails to 
reclaim it or forgets where it is.”70  This would occur when, for 
example, a person “momentarily places his wallet on a store counter 
while paying for a purchase, and then leaves the store without it.”71 
Similar to lost property, when a person takes possession of mislaid 
property, that person does not become the actual owner of the 
property.72  Rather, again, they assume constructive possession over 
the property that must be returned in full to the original property 
owner should they later claim the property.73 
Applying these standards, it is difficult to categorize the chairs left 
on the streets by Mono.  Frequently, furniture left on the streets is 
abandoned.  However, it is not clear Mono intended to relinquish all 
of the sticks in the bundle of property rights required for 
abandonment.   
It seems that Mono intended to release at least some of its 
property rights.  The point of the campaign was for the chairs to be 
taken and to follow where they went.74  The film shows INCOs sitting 
in the chairs sewing or playing instruments without evident 
objection.75  Thus, the right to use the property has been, at the very 
least, shared with the INCOs.76   
It also seems that the campaign gave the finder the right to 
exclude people or to sell the property.77  Mono sent agents to the 
homes of the INCOs to conduct interviews.78  In these interviews 
some INCOs revealed their intent to give the chairs to other people, 
without Mono or its agents contesting.79 
However, Mono may still be exercising at least one of the 
property rights to the chairs: its right to use the chairs.80  These chairs 
69. Id.
70. Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 37–38.
73. Id.
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were not typical abandoned furniture, where the owners are 
unconcerned with whether they see their former possession again.81  
In fact, before leaving the chairs on the streets, Mono publically 
announced that it intended to track the chairs in an ad campaign.82   
It is not clear whether Mono manifested the intent to abandon its 
right to use the chairs until after the ad campaign was completed, the 
GPS devices were turned off, and the camera crews sent home.83  If 
this were the case, the INCO would have no property claims that 
would supersede the authority of Mono’s exercise of rights.  This 
would preclude any trespass cause of action against Mono so long as 
they continued to exercise these rights.  Alas, by the time this intent 
to abandon becomes clear, vesting the finder with actual property 
rights over the original owner (rather than constructive right 
subordinate to the original owner), any actions that could have 
otherwise qualified as trespass arguably would have ended. 
A counterargument does remain.  It is possible to assert that 
Mono did not maintain use of the chair, but rather that it maintained 
use of the GPS device attached to it.  However, it seems that this 
argument remains in the realm of possibility without passing the 
threshold of plausibility.  Given the context of the advertising 
campaign inviting consumers to watch the “journey of the chairs” that 
carried their brand in an effort to advertise their furniture, it seems 
that Mono intended to exercise the right to use both the chair and the 
GPS device for profit, maintaining ownership rights over those of the 
INCOs. 
Determining that Mono’s operation of a GPS device attached to a 
chair qualifies as a trespass to chattels would likely require a policy-
oriented judge.  While not beyond the realm of legal precedent, it is 
certainly settled on the fringe.  While the court in Sotelo 
acknowledged the frustration of a property owner in its discussion of 
what qualifies as a harm sufficient to warrant damages under trespass 
to chattels, it is unclear whether an emotional harm, standing alone, 
would be sufficient.  Sotelo also included more tangible injuries, such 
as the spyware slowing down computer equipment and draining more 
energy.84   
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. While there is no direct knowledge that the devices have been disabled, it may be
suggested through Blu Dot’s deactivation of the online map that had previously been 
tracking the GPS devices on Blu Dot’s website.  See BLU DOt, http://www.bludot.com/ 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
84. Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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Furthermore, there is a strong argument that Mono had not 
abandoned the chairs while “intermeddling,” which, if applied, would 
eviscerate any case for trespass.  The judge would need to be willing 
to separate the GPS device and the chair and find that Mono had only 
continued to maintain a property interest in the GPS device.  The 
weaknesses in the claims of damage and ownership make a successful 
claim for trespass to chattels improbable under the current legal 
framework. 
2. Intentional Intrusion to Land
Mono may have committed a separate form of trespass for
intentional intrusion on land when it planted GPS devices to track the 
chairs’ locations.  The chairs found homes in the living rooms of 
several INCOs.  The Restatement explains: 
One is subject to liability to another for trespass . . . if he 
intentionally (a).  Enters land in the possession of the other, 
or causes a thing or a third person to do so, (b).  Remains on 
the land, or (c).  Fails to remove from the land a thing that he 
is under a duty to remove.85 
Courts have recognized that, unlike trespass to chattels, no 
physical harm to the property is required to justify a trespass action 
for intentional intrusion to land.86  In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that an actual harm occurs 
when the right to property exclusion is infringed upon.87  In Jacque, a 
housing company dragged a home across the plaintiff’s property 
without permission.88  Though this act caused no physical damages to 
the plaintiff’s property, the court recognized that the “right to exclude 
others from his or her land is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”89  
Thus, by infringing on the legal right to exclude, “the law recognizes 
that actual harm occurs in every trespass.”90 
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
86. 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997); See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158
(1965) (a trespasser will be liable irrespective of any harm caused by the trespass). 
87. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 159–60 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (quoting
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).  Accord Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)). 
90. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 160.
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“The action for intentional trespass to land is directed at 
vindication of the legal right.”91  In order to prevent a system of 
vigilante justice, the court recognized the value of providing legal 
remedies for infringements on property rights.92  As such, the court 
upheld an award of nominal actual damages and one hundred 
thousand dollars in punitive damages.93 
Not only is it unnecessary that the trespasser cause physical 
damages to be liable for trespass, the trespasser also need not 
physically enter the property of another.94  Rather, the trespassing 
agent can arise from nonhuman sources such as light, sound or 
smoke.95  The Restatement flushes out this aspect of trespass, noting 
that the trespasser must cause the trespassing agent to invade 
another’s property without consent, where the trespasser had 
substantial certainty that the trespass would occur.96 
Although consent is an affirmative defense to a claim of trespass, 
there is case law supporting the proposition that perceived “consent” 
based on fraud is not always a viable defense.97  The court in De May 
v. Roberts found that consent could be nullified where the property
owner gave it to someone assuming a false identity.98  There, the
91. Id. (citing in part Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, IX RUTGERS L. 
REV. 357, 374 (1954) and W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 13 (5th 
ed. 1984)). 
92. Id. at 160–61.
93. Id. at 163.
94. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (1996), holding:
At early common law, trespass required a physical touching of another’s
chattel or entry onto another’s land.  The modern rule recognizes an
indirect touching or entry; e.g., dust particles from a cement plant that
migrate onto another’s real and personal property may give rise to
trespass.  (See Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co. (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 229, 232–33
[185 Cal. Rptr. 280, 649 P.2d 922]; Roberts v. Permanente Corp. (1961)
188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 529 [10 Cal. Rptr. 519].)  But the requirement of a
tangible has been relaxed almost to the point of being discarded.  Thus,
some courts have held that microscopic particles ( Bradley v. American
Smelting and Refining Co. (1985) 104 Wn.2d 677 [709 P.2d 782, 788–89])
or smoke (Ream v. Keen (1992) 314 Or. 370 [838 P.2d 1073, 1075]) may
give rise to trespass.  And the California Supreme Court has intimated
migrating intangibles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a trespass,
provided they do not simply impede an owner’s use or enjoyment of
property, but cause damage.  (Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., supra, 32
Cal. 3d at pp. 233–34.)
95. Id.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158, cmt. (i) (1965).
97. De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 166 (Mich. 1881).
98. Id. at 149.
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plaintiff called a doctor to the plaintiff’s home to deliver her baby.99  
A male who was not a medical doctor accompanied the doctor.100  The 
property owner assumed the doctor’s companion was a physician or 
student.101  Under this assumption, the landowner allowed the 
companion into the home and delivery room.102  The court found that 
though the plaintiff “consented to the presence of [the defendant] 
supposing him to be a physician, [it would] not preclude her from 
maintaining an action and recovering substantial damages [for 
trespass] upon afterwards ascertaining his true character.”103 
Similarly, the court in Miller v. Brooks held that a person 
becomes a trespasser when he or she exceeds the scope of the 
property owner’s consent.104  In Miller, the plaintiff sued his wife, from 
whom he had been separated.105  Upon separation, the plaintiff told 
his wife not to enter the property without his consent.106  
Subsequently, the couple attempted to reconcile but were still legally 
separated.107  During the separation, the defendant hired a private 
investigator to install a surveillance camera in the plaintiff’s bedroom 
while the plaintiff was not home.108   
The defendant argued that as the plaintiff’s wife, she had 
permission to enter the premises and could give others that right.109  
The court found that, even if the defendant had consent to be on the 
plaintiff’s property, the defendant could still exceed the scope of that 
consent.110  Thus, when the defendant installed the surveillance 
cameras, her actions potentially extended beyond the scope of the 
consent to constitute a trespass.111 
However, there has been inconsistency among courts as to 
whether fraudulently obtained consent may qualify as an affirmative 
defense to trespass.112  In Dresnick v. American Broadcasting 
99. Id. at 146.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 147.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 149.
104. Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, 483
S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 1997). 




109. Id. at 355.
110. Id. at 355–56.
111. Id.
112. See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Corp., 44 F.3d 1345, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995).
 
2011] IS YOUR FURNITURE SPYING ON YOU? 475
Corporation, the court held that fraudulent intent did not negate the 
defense of consent.113  The defendant was a broadcasting company.114  
The defendant sent seven individuals undercover to investigate a 
cataract surgeon by posing as patients.115  The undercover actors were 
not interested in eye surgery, but had stated otherwise in the 
interview with the plaintiff.116  The plaintiff stated that he would not 
have allowed the undercover agent onto his property had he not been 
deceived.117   
Despite these misrepresentations, the court found that the 
consent was valid.  Accordingly, the court found the defendants were 
not liable for trespass.118  The court distinguished this case from other 
fraudulent consent cases, noting that the trespass occurred in a 
professional and not a personal setting, that the trespass did not 
disrupt the workplace, and that it did not occur in the plaintiff’s 
home.119 
Applying the logic from Steenberg and the fraudulent consent 
cases, there is an argument that the INCOs could maintain a trespass 
action against Mono.  The INCOs brought the chair into their home, 
not knowing that there was an electronic signal granting Mono access 
into their homes.  They were never aware that any parties were 
connected to the chair.  Even if the INCOs’ act of bringing the chair 
into the home could qualify as granting consent to the chair to enter, 
it was a misrepresentation for Mono to intentionally hide the device 
with the hopes that the INCOs would unknowingly bring it into their 
homes.   
Furthermore, applying the logic from Brookes, the INCOs 
granted the chair entrance to function as a chair, and the GPS signal 
would have exceeded the scope of the intended consent.  It would 
also not meet the Dresnik exception because the INCOs brought the 
chairs into homes, and not professional offices.  Thus, even though 
there were no damages to the property, Mono may have entered 
without consent, creating trespass liability.  
However, this again returns to the questions of ownership.  If the 
INCOs had come to own the chair and the GPS device, there may not 
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1348.
116. Id. at 1352.
117. Id. at 1351.
118. Id. at 1352–53.
119. Id.
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have been a trespass because one cannot trespass onto their own 
property.  Thus technology has outgrown the clear lines of precedent 
and it is unclear whether or not the entry of the GPS device would 
qualify as an intentional intrusion onto property trespass. 
B. Invasion of Privacy
The Supreme Court has historically granted the highest level of
privacy protection to the home.120  Tort law has also recognized and 
protected the privacy of residences.121  This part considers whether 
Mono violated privacy laws by hiding a GPS device in a chair with the 
intent that another would adopt the chair and unknowingly bring a 
GPS signal into their homes. 
The Restatement outlines causes of action for privacy invasions.122  
Most relevantly, Section 652B “provides a remedy when one ‘intrudes 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns’ if the intrusion is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person.’” 
In Nader v. General Motors, the court developed minimum 
standards for an invasion of privacy claim.123  The plaintiff sued for 
invasion of privacy after the defendant had investigated the plaintiff 
by interviewing his friends to discover his personal views and sexual 
proclivities, making harassing phone calls at odd hours, accosting the 
plaintiff with women to attempt to entrap the plaintiff into illicit 
relationships, and tapping the phone.124  The court determined that 
liability for invasion of privacy requires that the information sought 
be confidential in nature and the defendant’s conduct unreasonably 
intrusive.125  Additionally, the information must not be as readily 
available with normal observation and inquiry as to be publicly 
available.126  Applying this logic, the court determined the defendant 
was only liable for invasion of privacy for tapping the plaintiff’s 
phone which went beyond mere observation.127 
The INCOs will unlikely be able to sustain an invasion of privacy 
action for intrusion on solitude.  Mono’s method was likely intrusive. 
Hiding a surveillance device that the INCOs brought into their homes 
120. See Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B; SOLOVE, ROTENBERG &
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION AND PRIVACY LAW 30–31 (2d ed. 2006). 
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
123. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
124. Id. at 650.
125. Id. at 652.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 653–55.
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seems more intrusive than questioning friends, or making a phone 
call.  In terms of the technology, it is a close match to the phone tap 
that qualified as invasive in Nader.  However, possession of the chair 
is not likely to be deemed information that would not otherwise be 
available with normal observation and inquiry.  The chairs were 
found on a public street and were taken by the INCOs in the public 
view.  The chairs were in no way concealed to prevent the acquisition 
of this knowledge from the general public.  Thus, the INCOs would 
not likely be successful in an action for intrusion on solitude against 
Mono. 
IV. Statutory Recommendation
Mono’s covert use of GPS devices in their products for marketing 
purposes invited Internet viewers into the homes of others without 
the homeowners’ consent.  Although the location of a chair may not 
be sensitive enough to have sent the INCOs immediately to their 
lawyers, the idea of accepting such intrusive marketing gimmicks into 
our homes comes at the price of our privacy. 
The current legal framework fails to provide a suitable course of 
action for the INCOs who unwittingly became the subjects of the 
Experiment.  Trespass to chattels may be applicable by a judge who is 
willing to water down the damage requirement and sufficiently think 
“outside the box” to grant property rights in the chair to the INCOs. 
However, should an occasional policy-driven judge take this stance, 
because of these weaknesses in the legal logic, it is not likely to 
provide a consistently effective remedy for technological intrusions 
on privacy. 
While intentional intrusion to land may provide legal recourse, it 
also fails to ensure consistent protection against electronic intrusions. 
The judge must be willing to interpret the use of the GPS device as a 
trespass, and must also find that the finder’s act of bringing in the 
chair was not, in itself, consent.  Although precedent regarding 
fraudulent intent might protect against an affirmative defense of 
consent, courts have failed to rule consistently on the sufficiency of 
fraudulent consent.  Thus, although likely a stronger claim than 
trespass to chattels, this claim could also be denied by a judge. 
Further, extending the trespass cause of action to electronic 
trespass has raised criticism.128  One such criticism is that electronic 
trespass is overreaching.129  For example:  
128. Burk supra note 27, at 54–55.
 
478 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [33:3
[u]nwanted telephone callers would seem to be engaging in
trespass to chattels; the telephone call sends signals to the
instrument of the recipient. So, too, with fax machines that
receive unwelcome transmissions. Radios and televisions that
receive unwanted transmissions are impinged upon by
electromagnetic waves that induce the movement of electrons
within the receiver.130
Forward-thinking minds have been working to draft remedies in 
Washington to protect Americans from other technological invasions 
of privacy.131  For example, the U.S. House of Representatives passed 
the I-SPY Act, or Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2005.132  This 
Act creates criminal liability for the use of spyware to collect personal 
information without the user’s knowledge.133  Information protected 
as “personal” is defined as: 
A first and last name; a home or other physical address; an 
electronic mail address; a telephone number; a Social Security 
number, tax identification number, driver’s license number, 
passport numbers, or any other government-issued 
identification number; or a credit card or bank account 
number or any password or access code associated with a 
credit card or bank account.134 
Commission of these acts would be punishable by fine or 
imprisonment.135  Unfortunately, the Act has not yet become a law.136 
While the I-SPY Act does not yet have the force of law, it 
provides a syllogism within which to frame a law that specifically and 
expressly creates legal liability for technological intrusions, including 
Mono’s intrusion into the home of the INCOs with the GPS device. 
129. Id. at 34.
130. Id.
131. Tim Mammadov, Spyware Laws, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/about_5422099
_spyware-laws.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
132. Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007, and the Securing Air-Craft Cockpits
Against Lasers Act of 2007: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the H. Comm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2007), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/35113.PDF. 
133. Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. § 2(b)
(2005). 
134. Id. at § 2(d)(2) (formatting omitted).
135. Id. at § 2(b).
136. See Mammadov, supra note 131.
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Such a law should include both criminal and civil liability to not only 
deter corporations from using technology to take advantage of 
persons for their profit, but also to provide compensation to those 
who have fallen victim to such intrusions. 
The law should be forward-looking, taking into account future 
technologies and seemingly minor intrusions.  Mono’s use of GPS 
technology to monitor a chair may, on its own, seem unobtrusive. 
However, the level of intrusion these technologies are capable of can 
be severe.  One clear example would be if clothing companies marked 
their products with GPS devices.  This could show a person’s location 
at any given time, carving away significantly at the consumer’s 
privacy.  Thus, the legislation should forbid the use of tracking 
devices to collect information without clear consent. 
V. Conclusion
“The Real Good Experiment” was an experiment in pushing the 
legal limits.  The advertising campaign financed by Blue Dot brought 
Internet viewers into the INCOs’ homes without their knowledge. 
Although the laws of trespass to chattels have more recently been 
invoked to protect against technological intrusions on property, the 
ambiguity regarding damages and title to the chairs makes it a weak 
claim.  While the other trespass tort, intentional intrusion to land, 
may also be viable, the question of ownership over the chairs again 
arises, making the answer difficult to ascertain.  So although the 
trespass laws may work as a weapon when wielded by an open-
minded judge, the technology has largely outgrown the precedent. 
Privacy laws also fail to protect against unwanted guests in the 
realm of private life.  It is true the law against intrusion on seclusion 
would protect against information that was not otherwise available to 
the public.  However, it ignores the intrusion caused by the mere act 
of sneaking onto another’s property to obtain that information. 
Under this provision, it would seem even the most creative judges 
would have difficulty in applying this legal cause of action to Mono. 
Mono may escape liability today, but this gap in privacy 
protection should be filled.  By drafting a law that expressly addresses 
the issue of growing technology and provides clear limitations on use 
to protect the property and privacy rights of citizens, the legislature 
can create a more clear legal foundation for judges.  This would 
create more consistent protection and remove judges from the role of 
being judicial legislators. 
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